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Oct 13 2026
India's jawans need better kit, not gaslighting in the name of 'courage'
Overview
The Swarajya article “Courage Is Not Armour. India’s Jawans Need Better Kit” argues that courage, physical endurance and regimental pride cannot compensate for inadequate or outdated protective equipment. Author Sudharshan Garg maintains that an infantry soldier’s effectiveness and survival depend heavily on properly engineered, modern and integrated equipment.
The article highlights reported gaps in the personal equipment issued to sections of the Indian Army, including non-ballistic fibreglass helmets, partially protective steel headgear, heavy bulletproof jackets and privately purchased plate carriers. It argues that delayed procurement, emergency purchases and limited standardisation have produced an uneven equipment landscape across different formations.
Details
Article Information
Article: Courage Is Not Armour. India’s Jawans Need Better Kit
Alternative headline: India’s Jawans Need Better Kit, Not Gaslighting in the Name of “Courage”
Author: Sudharshan Garg
Publication: Swarajya
Reading time: Approximately seven minutes
Primary subject: The personal protection and combat equipment issued to Indian infantry soldiers
Central argument: Courage and training remain important, but they cannot replace modern, reliable and properly integrated military equipment.
Importance of Infantry Equipment
Historical context: The article uses examples from ancient warfare to demonstrate how superior equipment, organisation and energy-efficient combat methods can overcome individual physical strength.
Material advantage: Engineering and equipment can directly affect a soldier’s endurance, protection and ability to remain effective during combat.
Modern relevance: Despite the increasing use of drones, autonomous systems and space-based surveillance, infantry personnel remain essential for occupying and holding territory.
Survivability: Effective helmets, body armour, weapons, communications and supporting equipment can materially influence whether soldiers survive and complete their missions.
Integrated Soldier Systems
Modern military approach: Leading armed forces increasingly treat an infantry soldier’s equipment as a single integrated system rather than as a collection of unrelated items.
Five-subsystem framework: The article refers to five major equipment subsystems forming a modern infantryman’s kit.
Need for compatibility: Protective equipment, weapons, communications systems and load-bearing components should work together without restricting mobility or operational effectiveness.
Standardisation: A common and tested equipment configuration can improve training, maintenance, replacement and battlefield performance.
Model 1974 Fibreglass Helmet
Continued use: The article reports that a significant portion of non-frontline Army personnel continues to use the Model 1974 fibreglass helmet.
Original purpose: The helmet is described as an industrial-style protective shell intended primarily to guard against falling objects and overhead artillery fragments.
Ballistic limitation: According to the article, it does not provide meaningful protection against handgun or rifle fire.
Comparative concern: The report argues that even some steel helmets used during the Second World War provided better ballistic protection.
Steel Patka
Operational use: Soldiers deployed in active counter-insurgency areas reportedly use the heavy steel Patka as an alternative to the Model 1974 helmet.
Forehead protection: The Patka is designed to provide protection against rifle fire along its reinforced frontal band.
Coverage limitation: The article states that the upper part or crown of the soldier’s head remains inadequately protected.
Weight and comfort: The design may impose additional physical strain because of its weight and limited coverage.
Emergency Helmet Procurement
Procurement response: The Army reportedly placed emergency orders for approximately 45,000–60,000 helmets from domestic manufacturers.
Emergency framework: The mechanism was intended to bypass lengthy acquisition processes and accelerate delivery.
Financial ceiling: The article refers to a project limit of approximately ₹300 crore under the emergency procurement mechanism.
Delivery requirement: Suppliers were reportedly expected to deliver the equipment within 12 months.
Fragmented inventory: Purchases from different manufacturers have allegedly created variations in helmet designs and suspension systems.
Uneven distribution: Rear-echelon units and battalions stationed in non-operational areas may continue to wait for upgraded helmets.
Body Armour
Standard jacket: The conventional Ordnance Factory Board bulletproof jacket is reported to weigh approximately 8–10 kilograms or more.
Design concerns: The article describes the jacket as heavy, rigid, hot and insufficiently modular.
Attachment limitations: Standard jackets may lack suitable attachment points for ammunition, communications equipment and other mission-critical items.
Operational burden: Excessive weight and poor ergonomics can reduce mobility, increase fatigue and impair a soldier’s effectiveness.
Commercial Plate Carriers
Decentralised purchases: Some battalions operating in counter-insurgency environments reportedly use unit funds to purchase commercial plate-carrier shells.
Personal expenditure: In certain cases, soldiers may purchase plate carriers with their own money.
Use of issued plates: Soldiers may place their issued ceramic or steel protective plates inside commercially obtained carrier shells.
Market availability: The article refers to inexpensive nylon carriers sold in civilian markets, including shops in Jammu.
Reported price range: Some commercial plate carriers reportedly cost between ₹2,500 and ₹4,500.
Multiple suppliers: Field photographs are said to show numerous domestic and imported makes being used by different personnel.
Risks of Limited Standardisation
Inconsistent protection: Different plate carriers, helmets and suspension systems may provide varying levels of protection and reliability.
Compatibility concerns: Commercially obtained carriers may not always be designed or certified for the specific protective plates placed inside them.
Training difficulties: Soldiers using different equipment configurations may not receive uniform training in adjustment, maintenance and emergency removal.
Supply complications: A fragmented inventory can make repairs, replacement parts and logistical support more difficult.
Quality assurance: Privately purchased or locally sourced equipment may not always have undergone consistent military testing and certification.
Procurement Challenges
Stalled tenders: The article attributes parts of the equipment shortfall to delayed or unsuccessful procurement processes.
Piecemeal purchasing: Emergency orders can address immediate operational needs but may not create a uniform, long-term equipment system.
Policy and field gap: The reported conditions illustrate a difference between modernisation objectives and the equipment available to some soldiers.
Long-term requirement: The article supports a coordinated procurement programme covering protection, weapons, communications, ergonomics and load carriage as an integrated package.
Broader Message
Beyond symbolism: Praising bravery should not become a substitute for providing adequate equipment.
Institutional responsibility: Ensuring that soldiers receive tested, standardised and mission-appropriate equipment is a responsibility of the defence establishment.
Operational readiness: Modern personal equipment can improve survivability, mobility, situational awareness and combat performance.
Further information: The complete analysis and remaining equipment-related findings are available in the full article linked in the original Swarajya communication.
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